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Abstract
This article sheds light on two under-researched issue areas: the energy policy-shaping role of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) and how constitutionalization of EU state aid law gives the European Commission (Commission)
increased leverage over EU policy development. EU state aid governance is embedded in the Treaty of the Functioning
of the EU’s prohibition of state aid. The CJEU and the Commissions’ Directorate-General for Competition (DG Comp) have
played important roles in the emergence of stronger EU steering of renewable energy support schemes after 2014. For
many years, powerful member states, most notably Germany, stopped the adoption of EU rules requiring more market
streamlining and European harmonization of renewables support. This primarily played out in regular EU decision-making
(co-decision) related to adoption and revision of the Renewable Energy Directive. A radical shift occurred in 2014 when
the Commission introduced new guidelines on state aid for environmental protection and energy, giving the Commission
increased authority over development of renewables support schemes across Europe. These guidelines called for renew-
ables investments to become more exposed to energy market pricing and introduced auctioning as the main allocation
mechanism. Support schemes for renewable energy were included for the first time in the EU state aid guidelines for en-
vironmental protection in 2001. Back then, member states had ample leeway to design support schemes as they pleased.
The 2014 version of the guidelines includes farmore detailed requirements.While the first CJEU ruling on renewables state
aid hindered the Commission to intervene, new CJEU rulings after 2008 enabled the Commission to draft more restrictive
guidelines. This article concludes that constitutionalization, combined with the policy entrepreneurship of Commission of-
ficials, explains the shift in EU steering in 2014. This indicates that constitutionalization and Commission entrepreneurship
should be assessed in conjunction. Constitutionalization may be particularly important in the state aid area due to the
superior competence of the Commission.
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1. Introduction
Susanne K. Schmidt (2018) and Dieter Grimm (2015,
2017) argue that over time, the Treaty of the Function-
ing of the EU (hereinafter ‘Treaty’)1 has acquired the role
of the EU’s de facto constitution. Due to this develop-
ment, case law from the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (hereinafter ‘CJEU’ or ‘Court’)2 has acquired
constitutional status. This gives the Courtmore influence
over EU policy development than many EU scholars rec-
1 This Treaty has changed name several times over the years and the 2009 Lisbon Treaty introduced the term referred here. I will refer to it as ‘the Treaty’
irrespective of time period.
2 In 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the term ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’. Formerly it had been named ‘Court of Justice of the European
Community’, commonly referred to as the ‘European Court of Justice’ in the literature (see Saurugger & Terpan, 2017, pp. 2–3).
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ognize. Schmidt (2018) finds that EU policymaking has
become highly constrained by case law in the sense that
the Council of the EuropeanUnion (hereinafter ‘Council’)
and the European Parliament (hereinafter ‘Parliament’)
often adapt their decisions to harmonize with case law
(Schmidt, 2018, p. 3). In this article, we explore how and
to what extent constitutionalization may enable the Eu-
ropean Commission (hereinafter ‘Commission’) to make
important policy decisions on its own without ordinary
democratic procedures.
State aid is an especially interesting issue area to ex-
plore when it comes to the relationship between CJEU
case law and the Commission. Several authors argue
that the Commission has increasingly used state aid
rules as its last resort to steer national developments
(Blauberger, 2009; Smith, 1998). EU state aid rules are
inherently political; they involve choosing between com-
peting political objectives, and the decision outcomes
constrain the powers of national governments (Büthe,
2016, p. 38; Kassim & Lyons, 2013). It is the prerogative
of the college of Commissioners to adopt state aid guide-
lines (Büthe, 2016; Commission, 2014). Such guidelines
must draw on the Treaty and CJEU case law, and must
present principles for assessment of compatibility of aid
(Banet, in press). The guidelines are not legally binding
on member states, but they are binding on the Commis-
sion. Member states may challenge the guidelines, but
this may entail long delays and hold back renewables
investments while litigation goes on. Hence, the exact
wording of the state aid guidelines may be of crucial im-
portance for development of national practices in the
areas they cover. Still, few scientists have attempted to
explain revisions of EU state aid guidelines (for one of the
exceptions, see Flåm, 2009).
This article presents a longitudinal study of how CJEU
case law has influenced EU renewables policy develop-
ment from the 1970s up to 2014. It pays particular at-
tention to how constitutionalization has constrained and
enabled the Commission to perform entrepreneurship
and thus ‘induce authoritative political decisions that
would not otherwise occur’ (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 271).
Until quite recently, feed-in schemes dominated in the
EU. These offered beneficiaries a fixed price for electric-
ity for 15 to 20 years, independent of market price flucta-
tions, often ensuring different renewables technologies
different levels of support (Cointe & Nadaï, 2018). To the
surprise of many, the 2014 state aid guidelines steered
the countries towards shifting to competitive auctioning
combined with feed-in premium (a support on top of
the spot market electricity price; Fitch-Roy, Benson, &
Woodman, 2019).
Hence, this article asks:How and towhat extent have
constitutionalization and Commission entrepreneurship
shaped the 2014 shift in EU steering of national renew-
ables support schemes?
While EU renewables policy development follows
ordinary legislative procedure (formerly called co-
decision), the Commission has the upper hand in revising
state aid guidelines. In the ordinary procedure, the Com-
mission presents a draft, the Council and the Parliament
put forward amendments and, finally, the Parliament
and the Council jointly adopt a decision. The Commis-
sion’s Directorate-General for Energy (DG Ener) drafts
renewables policy proposals, while the Directorate-
General for Competition (DG Comp) drafts state aid
guidelines3. Governance scholars have recently stepped
up their efforts to make sense of the radical expansion
of renewable energy within the EU. Hence, we now
know far more about the politics and dynamics of EU
renewables policy than a few years back (e.g., Boasson
& Wettestad, 2013; Bürgin, 2015; Cointe & Nadaï, 2018;
Solorio & Jörgens, 2017). However, we still lack a good
understanding of the 2014 shift towards stronger EU
steering of national support schemes. This shift did not
result from changes in the EU renewables policy proper,
but rather from the introduction of new guidelines on
state aid for environmental protection and energy. Some
authors have explored how the 2014 shift in the EU
state aid steering influenced renewable energy decision-
making at the member state level, but this article is the
first (to my knowledge) that aims to explain the 2014
shift (Leiren & Reimer, 2018; Tews, 2015).
As a general rule, the Treaty prohibits state aid, and
the state aid guidelines are intended to help clarify when
renewables support qualifies as state aid and under
which conditions it can still be accepted (Banet, in press).
The state aid guidelines clarify these conditions. In or-
der to fall under the Treaty’s definition of state aid, re-
newables aid must be: 1) granted by a member state or
through state resources; 2) distort or threaten to distort
competition; 3) selectively favour certain undertakings;
and 4) affect trade between member states (Community
Guidelines, 2008, Article 7.1). Renewables aid that fulfils
these criteria can only be accepted if it promotes EU cli-
mate and energy policy objectives and interests (Commu-
nity Guidelines, Article 1).
The 2014 guidelines differ radically from how re-
newables support was dealth with in prior guidelines
and renewables directives. They prescribe that aid be
‘granted in a competitive bidding process on the basis of
clear, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria’ (Com-
munity Guidelines, Article 3.3.2.). Indeed, all new aid
schemes are required to grant aid as a premium in addi-
tion to the electricity market price. The bidding process
may be limited to specific technologies if certain condi-
tions are met: if there is a ‘need to achieve diversifica-
tion’; if the installed electricity capacity is very small; if
the number of projects is limited; or if competitive bid-
ding could lead to higher support levels. Such exemp-
tions may only be made if they do not distort the elec-
tricity market or if the energy markets are so poorly de-
signed that market-based support schemes would not
work. The Commission argues that during 2020–2030
established renewable energy sources will become grid-
3 The names of these DGs vary during the period covered by this paper. For simplicity I will refer to them consistently as ‘DG Comp’ and ‘DG Ener’.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 70–80 71
competitive and subsidies should be phased out in a de-
gressive way (Community Guidelines, 2014 Article 3.2.4).
The 2014 guidelines accept electricity certificatemarkets
(also called renewables portfolio standards) as an alter-
native to auctioning and feed-in premium.
We will now discuss how constitutionalization and
Commission entrepreneurship may help us assess and
understand this outcome.
2. Constitutionalization and Commission
Entrepreneurship
In the early 1960s, the CJEU declared EU law ‘to be di-
rectly applicable in the Member States to the effect that
individuals could derive rights from it and claim them
before the national courts’ and decided that the Treaty
should enjoying ‘primacy over national law’ (Grimm,
2015 p. 466; see also Schmidt, 2018, p. 1). Based on this
jurisprudence the Treaty started to serve as a constitu-
tion: when the treaties are applied in accordance with
the binding interpretations of the CJEU, European inte-
gration that is not endorsed by the member states may
occur (Grimm, 2015, p. 469, 2017, p. 5).
The CJEU has influenced the behaviour of EU policy-
makers, which in turn has influenced EU policy on many
issues (Martinsen, 2015, p. 1622; Saurugger & Terpan,
2017, p. 3; Stone Sweet, 2010, p. 7). For many years,
scholars understood this development as ‘judicial ac-
tivism’ or ‘judicialization’, referring ‘to a process through
which judges and courts act as policymakers, comple-
menting, substituting or competing with political actors’
(Terpan & Saurugger, 2018, p. 1). This research tradition
primarily explores the CJEU judges’ motivations and rul-
ings. In contrast, the emerging ‘constitutionalization’ lit-
erature aims at increasing our understanding of how the
CJEU influences European integration and EU policy de-
velopment in the long run (Grimm, 2015; Schmidt, 2018;
Weiler, 1991).
Because EU politics is ‘too fragmented to respond to
and correct the court’, the CJEU judges have ample op-
portunity to influence EU policy development (Grimm,
2019, p. 9; Martinsen, 2015, p. 12). Susanne K. Schmidt
(2018, pp. 3, 8–9) argues that ambiguous and unclear for-
mulations in the Treaty and in EU secondary law (such
as directives and regulations) generate legal uncertainty.
This leads private actors to litigate issues for the Court,
resulting in rulings that again advance the impact of EU
law. To create more legal certainty, EU policymakers may
subsequently codify CJEU case law into secondary EU law
(by, for example, incorporating them into directives or
regulations). In issue areas characterized by constitution-
alization, the leeway thatmember states have ‘ultimately
depends on the extent to which the Court rules that the
Treaty applies to the national situation’ (Schmidt, 2018,
pp. 10–11).
Schmidt (2018, p. 7) argues that constitutionalization
will play out in path-dependent ways and over long pe-
riods. The constitutional nature of case law, policymak-
ers’ inherent tendency to develop ambiguous compro-
mises, and the CJEU’s tradition of responding to all cases
that are brought before it will eventually create a path-
dependent development whereby CJEU’s rulings will end
up determining policy development in certain areas. The
initial rulings will be particularly important.
Based on this background, we expect to find that the
2014 shift in the EU steering of national renewables sup-
port schemes can be explained by:
• Neither the EU Treaty nor the EU renewables pol-
icy proper providing legal certainty about renew-
ables support schemes, causing the CJEU to be
challenged to resolve the issue.
• Initial CJEU rulings on national renewables support
schemes creating precedence for later decisions,
leading to a gradual case law development that
eventually brought about the 2014 shift.
In this article, we are particularly interested in exploring
whether and how constitutionalization within the state
aid area may strengthen the ability of the Commission
to perform successful entrepreneurship. While Schmidt
underlines that the Commission has a key role due to
its privileged access to and knowledge about the Court,
she concludes that we know little about how the Com-
mission may exploit the constitutionalization logic to
strengthen its impact (Schmidt, 2018 p. 35). On the other
hand, several studies of EU state aid policy (Blauberger,
2009; Smith, 1998) conclude that the Commission has en-
hanced its autonomy in state aid cases by repeatedly per-
forming entrepreneurship, exploiting CJEU rulings to gain
progressively more power over this issue area.
Policy entrepreneurship ‘is an effort to wield polit-
ical power’ and to ‘induce authoritative political deci-
sions that would not otherwise occur.’ (Moravcsik, 1999,
p. 271). It is performed by actors who seek to ‘punch
above [their] weight’ (Green, 2017, p. 1473). By contrast,
actors who merely ‘do their job’ and do what is ‘appro-
priate’ cannot be considered entrepreneurs (Boasson &
Huitema, 2017, p. 1351). Commission officials can per-
form different types of entrepreneurship. First, they may
perform cultural-institutional entrepreneurship, in the
sense that they consciously frame their ideas and pro-
posals to make them appear as attractive as possible
(Boasson, 2015, p. 68). If this is the case, we will see that
Commission officials have actively framed their favoured
support scheme designs as superior, and have worked
methodically to ensure that these understandings be in-
cluded in the state aid guidelines.
In addition, the Commission may perform struc-
tural entrepreneurship; that is, acts aimed at enhanc-
ing influence by altering the distribution of authority
and information (see Boasson, 2015, p. 70). Network-
ing and the strategic use of decision-making procedures
are particularly important in this respect. Concerning
the former, we expect Commission officials to have
had much informal contact with Commission officials in
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other directorates-general as well as with key societal
actors such as electricity utilities and renewables indus-
try actors. Commission officials will use these networks
to persuade others and ensure coordinated behaviour
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).
When it comes to the strategic use of decision-
making procedures, Commission officials will aim to ex-
ploit open policy windows and perform venue shop-
ping. Exploitation of policy windows relates to timing:
the ability to launch a proposal at the exact moment
in time when it is most likely to be adopted. Kingdon
(1984/2011, p. 165) regarded a policy window as ‘an op-
portunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet so-
lutions, or to push attention to their special problems.’
Subsequent studies have shown that the existence of
policy windows enhances entrepreneurial activities and
sometimes also entrepreneurial success (see review in
Boasson & Hutema, 2017, p. 1354). Entrepreneurs can
also enhance their influence by ensuring that their ‘pet is-
sue’ comes up for decision in the decision-making venue
where it is expected to achieve their preferred outcome.
For instance, we expect Commission officials to strategi-
cally assess whether their favoured solutions are more
likely to be accepted in the revision of state aid guidelines
or in the revision of the EU renewables policy proper
(Kingdon, 1984/2011).
On this background, we expect to find that the 2014
shift in the EU steering of national renewables support
schemes can be explained by:
• Commission officials working strategically to
frame feed-in premiums combinedwith auctioning
as the most appropriate support scheme design.
• Commission officials exploiting policy windows as
well as performing venue shopping and network-
ing to achieve their preferred outcome.
Let us now move on to present the longitudinal qualita-
tive case study. The main method is process tracing; sys-
tematic within-case analysis aimed at identifying associ-
ations between cause and outcome. Four main sources
have been combined: 1) reviews of existing literature
on EU renewables and state aid policies (political sci-
ence as well as juridical literature). Existing literature, in-
cluding my own study of EU renewables directives, has
been especially important for descriptions of the old-
est phases of development; 2) systematic assessments
of Commission working documents, state aid guidelines
from 2001, 2008 and 2014, inputs to two public con-
sultation processes between 2012 and 2014, and rele-
vant Court judgements and advocate general opinions;
3) semi-structured interviews with 10 individuals from
DG Comp, DG Ener and DG Legal Service (cabinet mem-
bers as well as lower-ranking civil servants) and repre-
sentatives from electricity and renewables energy indus-
try associations. Due to the sensitive nature of the is-
sue, all interviewees are anonymized and no interviews
were recorded. All interviews where transcribed imme-
diately after being conducted (see list of interviewees).
Interview information has primarily been used to specify
details in the chronological order and to specify relation-
ships between various actors. Information from the dif-
ferent interviewees has been systematically compared.
3. Renewables Support: From Rare and National to
Common and EU Steered
3.1. 1970–1999: The Commission Promotes an EU-Wide
Market-Based Scheme and Challenges German Feed-In
During most of this period, the EU’s authority within the
realm of state aid was contested, and renewable energy
was primarily a national policy issue (Boasson & Wettes-
tad, 2013; Büthe, 2016, p. 39). After the oil shocks in
the early 1970s, three different domestic renewables
strategies gradually emerged. First, Germany, Denmark
and, eventually, Spain embarked on technology-specific
schemes, with no exposure to market forces (Boasson
& Wettestad, 2013, pp. 82–83). They launched feed-
in schemes, relying on fixed support levels for rather
long time periods and guaranteed grid access. These
schemes led to the emergence of small-scale domes-
tic renewable energy industries. The second group of
countries—Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the
UK—offered R&D support and some other measures,
but did not develop feed-in schemes. In these countries,
the traditional utilities initiated a few renewable energy
plants but no new renewables industries emerged. The
third and largest group of European countries hardly pro-
moted renewables.
In 1988 the Commission considered harmonizing re-
newables support, but this came to nothing (Rusche,
2015, p. 25, p. 81–82). The first renewables schemes
were notified to the Commission in 1990; DG Comp
found that both the British and the German schemes
constituted state aid, but swiftly approved both. A little
later, DG Comp endorsed schemes in the Netherlands,
Sweden, Finland and Denmark.
Germany subsequently changed its scheme and the
German Utilities Association lodged a complaint with
the Commission over application of the state aid rules
(Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006). In response, DG Comp sent
a letter to the German government expressing doubt
about the continued compatibility with state aid rules
and proposing amendments that would bring German
law in line with the rules, leading to a reduction in feed-
in rates (CJEU, 2000, Articles 19–21). In 1998 Germany
introduced a revised scheme but, despite consultations
with DG Comp, did not follow up any of the propos-
als from the Commission (CJEU, 2000, Articles 34–38).
Instead, Germnay decided that the distribution system
operators (DSOs) could pass on their additional eco-
nomic burden from buying electricity from renewables
to the transmission system operators (TSOs). Although
CG Comp complained about this to Germany, it refrained
from asking Germany to notify because it expected a
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new renewables directive to introduce harmonised re-
newables rules.
At this stage, the electricity supplier PreussenElektra
AG refused to pay Schleswag (distribution system opera-
tor) the extra costs incurred in buying renewables elec-
tricity required by the German feed-in law (Kuhn, 2001;
Rusche, 2015, p. 38). The issue was brought before a Ger-
man court, which eventually asked the CJEU to clarify
whether PreussenElektra was right when it argued that
the German scheme fell under the Treaty’s definition of
state aid (CJEU, 2000, 2001). In the two years that passed
before the CJEU reached a judgement, a major political
controversy emerged in Brussels over EU steering of re-
newables aid in a new renewables directive (CJEU, 2000,
Article 38).
DG Ener argued that national support schemes were
no longer compatible with state aid rules. It suggested
creating a market-based pan-European ‘renewable en-
ergy credit’ scheme, and began drafting a directive that
would lead to this development (Boasson & Wettestad,
2013, pp. 84, 87; Rusche, 2015, p. 30). While the largest
European electricity utilities supported the idea, the re-
newable energy industry mobilized against it (Boasson
& Wettestad, 2013, pp. 84–85). Both industries had
ties to Commission officials who supported their oppos-
ing views.
While the German government protested vigorously
against the Commission’s initiative, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the UK were more positive. At the domes-
tic level, the market idea got off to a rather bad start;
the British quota system failed to yield much produc-
tion and the Dutch government abandoned its voluntary
certificate scheme soon after its introduction (Boasson
& Wettestad, 2013, pp. 85–86). In the end, the EU en-
ergy ministers allowed the Commission to develop a re-
newables directive on the condition that it did not aim
to steer the national support schemes. In parallel, DG
Comp began more actively reviewing member states’
state aid practices in a range of issue areas (Büthe, 2016,
pp. 56–58).
By the late 1990s the Court had largely confirmed
that the Treaty gave the Commission substantial author-
ity over state aid, but it was unclear which and howmany
renewables schemes fell under the Treaty’s definition of
state aid (Büthe, 2016, pp. 56–58). The Commission had
gained authority to require recipients of unlawful aid
to repay aid, but many years would pass before it be-
came clear whether it could apply this authority to re-
newables schemes.
3.2. 2000–2004: The CJEU Constrains Commission
Steering and Member States Block Harmonization
The Commissions’ understanding of how and to what
extent it could influence national renewables support
was fundamentally challenged during this period. In the
midst of the heated discussion about the renewables di-
rective, the advocate general of the CJEU in 2000 con-
cluded that the changes that Germany had introduced to
its feed-in law in 1998 were not sufficient to trigger the
need for a new notification and, most importantly, that
the scheme did not constitute state aid (CJEU, 2000, Ar-
ticle 19; Kuhn, 2001). Since neither PreussenElektra nor
Schleswagwas publicly owned, themoney never actually
passed through the state or through state resources, and
thus the CJEU did not regard theGerman scheme as state
aid (Rusche, 2015, p. 83). This decision came as a great
surprise to DG Ener, DG Comp and DG Legal Service (the
latter defended the view of the Commission in court; In-
terviewees 5, 6 and 8).
Already before the CJEU had made its decision, Ger-
many changed its system again, introducing technology-
specific support levels guaranteed for 20 years (CJEU,
2000, Articles 34–38; Cointe & Nadaï, 2018, pp. 6,
61). Gemany did not notify the revised scheme to the
Commission, nor did France when it adopted a similar
scheme, although the French government repaid utilities
with state resources (CJEU, 2013; Rusche, 2015).
Many struggled to interpret the precedence created
by PreussenElektra: did the ruling imply that neither
the Commission nor the CJEU could overrule national
renewables support schemes, or was the German case
so special that it did not really create precedence (see
Kuhn, 2001, p. 364; Rusche, 2015, p. 85)? Interviewees
with knowledge of this period, regard PreussenElektra as
highly significant. One (Interviewee 6) states: ‘It is amaz-
ing howmuch this influenced the understanding of state
aid.’ DG Comp officials were confused, leading their deci-
sions in the immediate aftermath of the judgment to lack
consistency (Rushe, 2015, p. 86). In any event, the Court’s
decision legitimized a swift diffusion of feed-in schemes
among EU member states (Cointe & Nadaï, 2018, p. 63).
In 2000, DG Ener published a draft renewables di-
rective, suggesting a deadline for EU wide harmoniza-
tion of support schemes. The Parliament rejected the
deadline, and eventually the Energy Council accepted
the draft with notable exemptions. The renewable direc-
tive adopted in September 2001 made no reference to
market streamlining or harmonization (European Parlia-
ment and Council 2001/77/EC). The same year, DG Comp
launched the first state aid guidelines that included re-
newable energy. The guidelines did not promote market
streamlining or harmonization (Community Guidelines,
2001). They distinguished between how investment sup-
port and operational support could be calculated, but in-
troduced no clear limitations on howmuch a renewables
plant could receive over its lifetime. Calculations of in-
vestment support should be based on the ‘extra costs’
compared to conventional plants. It was made clear that
operating aid would ‘usually be allowable’ and two de-
sign optionswere presented: a) the ‘extra cost’ approach:
provide aid ‘to compensate for the difference between
the production cost of renewable energy and themarket
price’ or b) the application of ‘market mechanisms such
as green certificates or tenders’ (Community Guidelines,
Articles E.3.3.2 and E.3.3.3.).
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In the following years, the countries that first
adopted feed-in schemes stayed on their original path
and many others copied them, making feed-in the
most common way to promote renewables (Boasson &
Wettestad, 2013, pp. 86–87). A few countries opted for
green certificate schemes; for instance, Sweden adopted
a scheme that immediately boosted renewables invest-
ment. Still, by 2005 the scientific literature as well
as most DG Ener documents concluded that feed-in
schemes were more effective and less costly than elec-
tricity (green) certificates (Cointe & Nadaï, 2018, p. 72).
3.3. 2005–2009: Conflicts over the Revised Renewables
Directive, Little Attention Paid to Key CJEU Ruling
When climate change climbed to the top of the EU
agenda as the union prepared for the global climate
summit in Copenhagen in 2009, conflicts over renew-
ables support resurfaced (Boasson & Wettestad, 2013,
pp. 87–94). By now, a significant renewables industry
had emerged that had exceptionally strong ties to parts
of DG Ener and the Parliament. The renewables pro-
moters were united in their skepticism towards market
streamlining and EU harmonization.
By this stage, only seven EUmember states had green
certificate schemes, whereas 18 had feed-in schemes
(Commission, 2008a). While many in DG Ener were
pleased with the diffusion of feed-in schemes, other
Commission officials started to float the idea of a pan-
European certificate scheme (Boasson & Wettestad,
2013, pp. 87–94). They envisaged a scheme where aid
would be granted to the least costly renewables projects,
market forces would determine the support levels, and
governments would no longer be able to favour specific
technologies. The renewables industry, as well as Ger-
man and Spanish ministries, criticized the idea. The tone
of the discussion was harsh; actors accused each other
of fraud, lack of credibility and of being reactionary.
DG Ener officials opposed to themarket approach en-
sured that the draft directive was ‘leaked’ in December
2007 (Boasson &Wettestad, 2013, p. 91). This happened
only weeks before the Commission was to launch the
draft. Even though the renewables community had little
time to lobby against the draft, it largely succeeded. One
month later, in January, the Commission issued a new
and rather inconsistent draft directive, opening up for
certificate trading but not for creating a pan-European
scheme (Commission, 2008b). At the same time, DG
Comp launched revised state aid guidelines. The 2008
guidelines were quite similar to the 2001 version and
were not aligned with the draft directive. They did, how-
ever, give more weight to incentivizing lower support lev-
els (Community Guidelines, 2008, Article 1.3.5). An inter-
viewee (5) fromDG Ener thinks that the state aid revision
was not strongly coordinated with the renewables direc-
tive revision, while an interviewee from DG Legal Service
(5) states: ‘When they suggested developing a directive
at the same time, it would be too blatant if they simulta-
neously included it in the guidelines. This was due to po-
litical considerations.’ A DG Comp interviewee states ‘no-
body cared about state aid guidelines in 2008. It is only
more recently that it has attracted a lot of interest.’
At around the same time, the Court radically changed
its interpretation of the Treaty. First, the CJEU advocate
general issued an opinion in January 2008 in the Essent
Netwerk Noord BV case, which dealt with state aid in
the electricity sector in general. Here, the advocate gen-
eral argued that PreussenElektra was very special; in
this case the feed-in costs were not transferred through
state resources, and no public entities or private enti-
ties created by the government were involved, but this
was rare. Hence, it had little general value for how state
aid rules should be understood (CJEU, 2008; Rusche,
2015, pp. 103–104). The Court upheld this view in July
(Mortensen, 2008). According to interviewees (5, 6),
DG Comp had long wanted to challenge PreussenElek-
tra, and the Essent Netwerk Noord BV paved the way for
such efforts.
The renewables directive revision was hotly debated
throughout 2008. By now, an increasing number of
voices raised the concern that many feed-in schemes
overcompensated renewables (Cointe & Nadaï, 2018,
p. 90). A Commission interviewee (8) even states: ‘We
had a lot of people we had never seen before coming
to us in black limousines. We understood back then that
something was wrong.’ This did not influence the po-
litical deliberations. A joint compromise proposal from
the UK, Poland and Germany in June 2008 was a ma-
jor breakthrough for the strategy of the renewables ac-
tors (Boasson & Wettestad, 2013, p. 92). The proposal
ensured member states control over their national sup-
port schemes. In the end, the Council and the Parliament
adopted a directive that required member states to con-
tinue to offer state aid to renewables, but they did not
give the Commission new authority.
By the end of 2009, the EU had adopted a directive
that contained binding national renewables targets, but
no constraints on national renewables support designs.
A new CJEU ruling enabled the DG Comp to start apply-
ing its state aid powers on renewables support, but it
seems like few actors noticed this significant shift in CJEU
case law.
3.4. 2010–2016: DG COMP Rises to the Occasion
By 2010 it became clear that the economic crisis con-
strained many member states’ ability to offer renew-
ables support, while the renewables costs had reduced
dramatically. This made many reconsider their views
on renewables support schemes (Cointe & Nadaï, 2018,
pp. 89–90). Hence, the debate shifted from a trench war
to a more nuanced, though still sometimes heated, ex-
change of knowledge and ideas (Cointe & Nadaï, 2018,
pp. 94, 945).
Introduction of a significant share of intermittent re-
newables changed the price-setting mechanisms in Eu-
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 70–80 75
ropean electricity markets, largely to the disadvantage
of the large utilities. Around 2012 it became clear that
the industry faced severe economic challenges. The situ-
ation was particularly dire in Germany, where the whole-
sale power price was reduced by more than 50 per cent
from 2011 to 2016 (Newbery, Pollitt, Ritz, & Strielkowski,
2017, pp. 7–8). Over the years, Germany had added sev-
eral compensation mechanisms to its support scheme,
rendering the PreussenElektra ruling outdated. Hence,
the German Association of Energy Consumers lodged a
complaintwith the Commission, arguing that the scheme
constituted state aid (CJEU, 2016). In parallel, the CJEU
considered whether the French feed-in scheme consti-
tuted state aid, and in 2013 ruled that it did (CJEU,
2013). This signified a shift in case law, and late in 2013
DG Comp initiated a formal investigation procedure with
respect to the German scheme (CJEU, 2016, p. 13).
By this stage, DG Comp was in the midst of a major
‘modernization’ of all state aid practices, aimed at ensur-
ing economic efficiency as well as legal certainty (Fitch-
Roy et al., 2019). It asked stakeholders to complete a
questionnaire concerning revision of the state aid guide-
lines relating to renewables. In their replies to this ques-
tionnaire, the renewables industry called for minor alter-
ations to ensure a more effective implementation of the
2009 renewables directive, while the electricity indus-
try largely said it was fine with existing practices (Com-
mission, 2016). Assessment of the inputs indicate that
few expected major changes in the new guidelines. How-
ever, as one interviewee states: ‘The member states had
committed to the [renewables] targets, but it had con-
sequences that few had expected. When the financial
crisis came in addition, it was like a perfect storm.’ (In-
terviewee 4). DG Comp exploited this situation, and in
2013 it issued draft guidelines for consultationwhich sug-
gested radically ramping up EU steering towards compet-
itive tendering combined with feed-in premiums. One
Commission interviewee (8) who used to promoted cer-
tificate schemes stated: ‘We lost that in 2008....I was okay
with tendering. It was simply another way to ensure com-
petition and cost-efficiency’. Another (3) highlights how
auctioning fits the thinking of the Commission in general
and that the possibility for bidding processes had opened
up in many areas of state aid.
As very few EU countries applied feed-in premium
combined with competitive auctions at this stage, the
Commission’s proposal came as a great surprise, and
aroused significant protests (Fitch-Roy et al., 2019). Note
that while new CJEU rulings enabled the Commission
to develop this proposal, the CJEU said little about
how support schemes should be designed; it merely
specified that most schemes constituted state aid. The
draft received considerable attention and many inputs.
The seven largest utilities and the business association
Eurelectric supported the new approach (Commission,
2016). The renewables industry was more critical, argu-
ing that the proposal conflicted with the renewables di-
rective. Many interviewees, however, argue that the con-
flict over more or less market steering was not as promi-
nent as before. DG Comp hailed the new UK and Dutch
schemes as good models for national support schemes
(Interviews; Commission, 2014).
Many member states, however, voiced skepticism.
For instance, France, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the
UK all argued that the proposal was too restrictive and
called for more leeway. An interviewee that participated
in consultation meetings (3) refer to considerable mem-
ber state resistance. A letter from France, Germany, the
UK, and Italy in December 2013 confirms this (Change
Partnership, 2014). The member states wanted leeway
to continue with technology-specific feed-in to the ex-
tent they saw fit, and to avoid having to open up their
schemes to other countries. The final 2014 guidelines
were quite similar to the draft proposal, but included sig-
nificant exemptions from the feed-in premium and auc-
tioning requirement, allowing for more widespread use
of technology-specific feed-in than the 2013 proposal
(Community Guidelines, 2014; see Tews, 2015, p. 276).
Germany changed its scheme towards feed-in premi-
ums combined with auctioning already before the Com-
mission concluded in 2014 that the scheme constituted
state aid (CJEU, 2016, p. 16)4. One interviewee (6) argues
that Germany would never have adjusted its scheme
had it not been for Commission pressure, describing the
meetings between DG Competition and Germany as ‘re-
ally heated, really harsh’ and ‘they did all they could in
this case’. Another interviewee (5) expresses doubt as
to whether the German government was really that un-
happy with the changes, commenting that ‘the revision
was in a way modelled on the German situation.’
Interviewees (2, 6, 8 and 9) indicate considerable dis-
agreements between the DGs over the new approach,
and internal coordination seems to have been limited.
Nonetheless, the college of Commissioners adopted the
guidelines in April 2014. According to several intervie-
wees, the Commissioners cast formal votes, which is a
rare event. Let us now turn to assess how and to what ex-
tent constitutionalization and Commission entrepreneur-
ship shaped the 2014 shift.
4. Assessment and Conclusions
The new 2014 guidelines increased the Commission’s
steering of national renewable energy schemes, even
though the guidelines are not binding on member states
in strictly judicial terms. The guidelines asked the mem-
ber states to adopt a support schemedesign thatwas not
widely used in the EU at the time. It does not seem likely
that the member states would have endorsed this shift
in the strength and direction of EU steering if it had been
up for decision in an ordinary legislative procedure.
Let us first discuss how and to what extent constitu-
tionalization contributed to this development. First, do
we find that neither the EU Treaty nor the EU renew-
4 The CJEU confirmed this decision in 2016 (CJEU, 2016).
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ables policy proper produced legal certainty about re-
newables support schemes, and because of this the CJEU
was repeatedly challenged to resolve the issue? Yes, we
do. This first happened with PreussenElektra, 10 years af-
ter the first schemes gained Commission endorsement.
The CJEU took on the case because a German court had
referred it, but the original court case was initiated by
German electricity actors. This ruling had the opposite ef-
fect of what the German electricity industry had hoped
for: it constrained, rather than enabled, the Commission
to steer national support scheme development. Not un-
til 2008 did the CJEU reach a decision that undermined
PreussenElektra.
Second, did the initial CJEU ruling, PreussenElektra,
create precedence for later decisions, leading to a grad-
ual case law development that eventually brought about
the 2014 shift? In one respect, we will have to answer
in the negative; for a long time PreussenElektra hin-
dered the Commission in interfering in national renew-
ables scheme development. In contrast to the consti-
tutionalization expectation, this ruling neither inspired
EU renewable energy proper, nor was it challenged by
this secondary legislation. However, the CJEU’s Essent
Netwerk Noord BV ruling in 2008 did opened up for path-
dependent developments more in line with constitu-
tionalization arguments. This judgement created prece-
dence, and after this we see case law development
that eventually contributed to the 2014 shift. This il-
lustrates that CJEU rulings that undermine Commission
steering are less likely to cause path dependence, pri-
marily because such rulings hinder the Commission in
making decisions that can be contested and in turn lead
to new CJEU rulings. First when the CJEU breaks with
a decision that constrains the Commission that path-
dependent developments can be triggered. However,
we will need to bring in Commission entrepreneurship
to understand why the shift occurred in 2014 and why
the Commission choose to favour feed-in premium com-
bined with auctioning.
First, did Commission officials work strategically over
time to frame feed-in premiums combined with auction-
ing as the most appropriate support scheme design? If
we go back further than 2012, we need to reject this ex-
pectation. For several decades, DG Comp as well as of-
ficials from other DGs promoted a pan-European elec-
tricity (green) certificate scheme. The Commission first
started to promote competitive bidding in combination
with feed-in premiums in 2012. This was an adjustment
to the political realities; after all, this design option was
less different from the dominant feed-in scheme than
a pan-European certificate scheme. Moreover, we have
identified significant disagreements within the Commis-
sion, with centrally placed officials continuously defend-
ing the national feed-in approach. First during 2012 and
2013, DG Comp officials began to actively frame auction-
ing combined with feed-in premium as superior.
Second, did Commission officials exploit policy win-
dows, and perform venue shopping as well as network-
ing in order to achieve their preferred outcome? From
the mid 1990s onwards, the Commission did try to ex-
ploit some policy windows, but performed little venue
shopping and networking. From 2008 onwards, however,
we can largely confirm this expectation. DG Comp offi-
cials skillfully exploited the policy window that opened
around 2012. This window was created by the juxtaposi-
tion of the financial crisis, reduced technology prices, un-
foreseen electricity market distortions caused by increas-
ing renewables shares, the electricity industry’s mount-
ing economic challenges and the initiation of the mod-
ernization process for of all types of EU state aid. As the
debate over renewables support had become less rip-
roaring and the ideological differences had lost impor-
tance, it also became easier for the college of Commis-
sioners to endorse the shift.
Moreover, while Commission officials in 2008/2009
experienced that its draft renewables directive was com-
pletely rewritten by member states, DG Comp officials
operated in a venue where the college of Commission-
ers rather than the member states had formal powers.
This shift of venue did not result from a planned strate-
gic move by a unified group of Commission officials from
different DGs. Rather, we see that DG Ener and DG
Comp officials primarily tried to influence the processes
they led, i.e., where they held strong formal positions.
As DG Comp had more authority to steer the state aid
guidelines revision than what DG Ener had to steer the
renewables directive revision, it is maybe not surprising
that DG Comp was much more successful. The DG Ener
officials who initially promoted a pan-European certifi-
cate scheme remained rather passive in the state aid
guidelines revision. Indeed, we do not identify much con-
tact between DG Comp and DG Ener officials. True, the
electricity utilities and renewables industry had each de-
veloped contact with different officials in the Commis-
sion, but it does not seem as if either of these networks
were important in the state aid guidelines revision pro-
cess. Rather, as late as 2012 both groups seem largely un-
aware of the intentions of DG Comp. Entrepreneurship
from DG Comp officials was crucial to the 2014 shift, but
these actors came rather late to the game and do not ap-
pear to have collaborated much with actors outside the
Commission. Hence, the expectation is confirmed with
respect to policy windows, only partly confirmed with re-
spect to venue shopping and largely refutedwith respect
to networking; the latter was not important.
We can conclude that the constitutionalization per-
spective increases our understanding of the 2014 out-
come; CJEU case law development eventually enabled
the Commission to steer through state aid guidelines,
and hence constitutionalization contributed towithdraw-
ing policy options from ‘majoritarian decision-making at
the European and national levels’ (Schmidt, 2018, p. 2).
Indeed, we find that the leeway available to member
states ultimately depended on the extent to which the
Court ruled that the Treaty applied to the national sup-
port schemes (Schmidt, 2018, pp. 10–11). The important
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shift in EU steering did not result from decision-making
relating to EU’s renewables policy proper, but was re-
lated to the Commission’s drafting of state aid guide-
lines, a process where the Commission had the upper
hand. However, this did not happen due to slow-moving
irreversible path-dependent developments, as Susanne
Schmit (2018) suggests. Rather, the entrepreneurship of
Commission officials was crucial. Had it not been for the
skilled exploitation of a policy window and the shift of
decision-making venue, the Court’s rulings would proba-
bly not have had that significant ramifications. The case
presented in this article also indicates that constitutional-
ization may be more important than the literature on EU
state aid policy suggests (Blauerger, 2009; Büthe, 2016).
The 2008 CJEU ruling created a necessary basis for the
shift, but the outcome would probably have been differ-
ent if DG Comp officials, and eventually the college of
Commissioners, had not risen to the occasion in the pe-
riod 2012–2014. Note that the 2014 guidelines contain
some exemptions to themain rules regarding feed-in pre-
miums and auctioning. These seem largely to result from
member state and renewables industry pressures and
not from the factors highlighted in this article.
This article indicates that it is important to assess con-
stitutionalization and Commission entrepreneurship in
conjunction, and that constitutionalizationmaybe partic-
ularly important in the state aid area due to the superior
competence of the Commission.
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Annex I: List of Interviewees
Interviewee 1: Representative fromWind Europe, the European business association for wind energy industry.
Interviewee 2: Representative from the European Commission, DG Energy.
Interviewee 3: Representative from the EFTA Surveillance Agency.
Interviewee 4: Representative from Eurelectric, the European business association for the electricity industry.
Interviewee 5: Representative from the European Commission, DG Legal Service.
Interviewee 6: Representative from the European Commission, DG Competition (cabinet level).
Interviewee 7: Representative from Eurosolar, the European business association for the solar energy industry.
Interviewee 8: Representative from the European Commission, DG Climate Action (cabinet level).
Interviewee 9: Representative from the European Commission, DG Competition (low level).
Interviewee 10: Representative from EREF, the federation of national	renewable	energy associations in EU member states.
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